The Al Qaeda Threat

The Stratfor Terrorism Intelligence Report's assessment is that al Qaeda does not have the capability to be a strategic threat to the U.S. They differentiate between the "original" al Qaeda, or what they refer to as the al Qaeda core or "al Qaeda prime," and all the various broad assortment of "grassroot jihadists" that have no real connection to the original al Qaeda group.

They point out that they, of course, still pose a threat; but that is a tactical threat, not strategic. Attacks overseas against small, soft low-level targets have been deadlier than attacks on large-scale hard targets; and it is in this regard that Americans are still at risk.

A large country the size of the U.S. cannot seal its' borders so ironclad that terrorists are unable to enter, particularily a free and open society such as ours. No doubt there are people here now by way of visa fraud or who have entered illegally and undetected. Like all other countries, no doubt we have some "homegrown" operatives, people living here that have decided to become jihadists. This, I think, is the simple reality of it.

Another tactical reality, they say, and I cannot disagree, is that we cannot protect every possible target; not to mention how these attacks can be successful with a fair amount of ease - think of the Virginia Tech shooter and John Allen Muhammed, the D.C. sniper. There are just too many potential targets. We cannot guard them all. In particular, there are too many soft targets - malls, fairs, churches, football games, etc.

I have wondered since 9/11, why we have not had small attacks within our borders. They say the same thing:

Given this reality and the fact that jihadists are committed to staging attacks on U.S. soil -- and are willing to die in the process -- it really is rather astounding that we have not seen more jihadist attacks in the United States.

I think a reasonably large segment of the U. S. believes it is just a matter of time. It's not "if we will be attacked, it's when."

It has helped that since 9/11, the public has been more vigilant - more aware of events going around them. Prior to 9/11, we were asleep at the wheel, as was our government. This is meant as fair criticism, not a political statement, nor against any one administration. As the Stratfor analysis states: "Since 9/11 and the launching of the 'global war on terrorism', however, the U.S. government's anti-terrorism tool kit has been turned against the organization in full force."

A nuclear device is the one method, the one threat, that would guarantee a successful strategic strike - a strike that would cause massive casualties. However, since 9/11 and all the tools in place now fighting the GWOT, and the disruption we have caused, financial and otherwise, it would be extremely difficult for them to manufacture, or purchase this kind of a device. And conventional wisdom says that if they already possesssed such a device, as some "experts" claim, they most certainly would have used it by now.

There conclusion is this:

We believe the United States is long overdue for a jihadist attack. Like U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, we believe the elements are likely in place for such an attack in the near future. However, we do not believe the attack will be of the same magnitude as the 9/11 attacks.

The problem for al Qaeda is that the core group, in the words of the NIE, is "likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks and/or fear among the U.S. population." It is one thing to launch an attack against the Sears Tower, for example; it is quite another thing to succeed in bringing it down. We believe al Qaeda can attack a target like the Sears Tower, but our assessment is that the organization currently lacks the ability to launch a devastating strategic attack -- one that would destroy the target.

Does this mean al Qaeda will lack this capability forever? No. If the United States and its allies were to cease pressuring the organization, and the jihadist movement as a whole, it could in time regenerate the capability. However, we disagree with the NIE assertion that the group already has regenerated to that point. Al Qaeda prime is still dangerous at the tactical level, but strategically it is only a shell of its former self.